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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism
Johan E. Gustafsson∗
The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism
is true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In the stock
version of the argument, its two premisses state that (i) no one is, or ever
was, able to act so that the past would have been dierent and (ii) no
one is, or everwas, able to act so that the laws of naturewould have been
dierent. This stock version fails, however, because it requires an invalid
inference rule. The standard response is to strengthen both premisses
by replacing ‘would’ with ‘might’. While this response ensures validity,
it weakens the argument, since it strengthens the premisses. I show that
we can do better: We can keep the weak reading of one premiss and
just strengthen the other. This provides two versions of the Consequence
Argument which are stronger than the standard revision.
The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism is
true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In a bare-bones
version, the argument runs as follows:
If determinism is true, the remote past and the laws of nature jointly
entail each one of our acts. Neither the remote past nor the laws
of nature are up to us. Therefore, if determinism is true, our acts
aren’t up to us.
The standard modal version, by Peter van Inwagen, is stated in terms of
an unavoidability operator (van Inwagen 1983: 93–95):
Np =df p, and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p.
This version of the argument relies on two inference rules. The rst
concerns the relation between unavoidability and logical necessity, with
logical necessity represented by ‘◻’:
Alpha: From ◻p, deduce Np.
The second rule concerns the transfer of unavoidability, with ‘⊃’ repre-
senting material implication:
Beta: From N(p ⊃ q) and Np, deduce Nq.
∗ I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent
to me at johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
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Let P0 be a true proposition expressing a total state of the world at a time
before anyone had any choice about anything. Let L be the conjunction
of the laws of nature. And let P be an arbitrary true proposition. Then
the argument can be stated as follows:
The Consequence Argument (standard modal version)
(1) ◻((P0 & L) ⊃ P) A consequence of determinism
(2) ◻(P0 ⊃ (L ⊃ P)) From (1) by normal modal logic
(3) N(P0 ⊃ (L ⊃ P)) From (2) by Alpha
(4) NP0 Premiss, xity of the past
(5) N(L ⊃ P) From (3) and (4) by Beta
(6) NL Premiss, xity of the laws
(7) NP From (5) and (6) by Beta
[p. 706] The validity of this argument, however, depends on how, in
the denition of Np, we understand someone’s having a choice about
whether p. We need to distinguish the following readings (McKay and
Johnson 1996: 119 and Carlson 2000: 280):
NWp =df p, and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that p would
be false.
NMp =df p, and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that p might
be false.
That a person S is able to act at t so that p would (might) be false means
that S is able to act at t in such a way that, if S were to act in that way at t,
then p would (might) be false (Carlson 2002: 393).
The premisses of the Consequence Argument are notably weaker
given the NW reading than given the NM reading.1 But, given the NW read-
ing, there are counter-examples to Beta (Widerker 1987: 38–39, McKay
and Johnson 1996: 115–16, and Carlson 2003). Suppose, for instance, that
S does not toss a coin, although she can do so. Let p = “the coin
does not land heads”, and let q = “the coin is not tossed”. S is not
able to ensure that p is false. She cannot ensure that the coin lands
heads; if she were to toss it, it might land heads, but it might just
as well land tails. Hence, Np is true. Similarly, S cannot ensure
the falsity of p ⊃ q. If she were to toss the coin, p ⊃ q might be
false (since the coin might land tails), but it might equally well be
true (since the coin might land heads). Thus, N(p ⊃ q) is also true.
1 Given the stronger NM reading of the premisses, we do, however, get the stronger
conclusion NMP, rather than just NWP.
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However, Nq is false, since S can ensure the falsity of q by tossing
the coin.2 (Carlson 2003: 732)
[p. 707]Given theNM reading, Beta is not open to these counter-examples
(Carlson 2000: 286–87). So, to rid the Consequence Argument from
counter-examples to its validity, it appears that we must give its premisses
the stronger NM reading. This is also van Inwagen’s move.3 I shall show,
however, that we can do better: We only need to give one of the premisses
the stronger NM reading. The other premiss can have the weaker NW
reading.
Consider the following inference rules for NW and NM:4
AlphaM: From ◻p, deduce NMp.
2 To avoid this counter-example, O’Connor (1993: 209) suggests the following revi-
sion:
Beta′: From N(p ⊃ q), Np, and p is made true earlier than q, deduce Nq.
Nonetheless, Carlson puts forward amore complicated counter-example that also applies
to Beta′:
At time t0 S can either press or not press a certain button, which is con-
nected to a coin-tossing mechanism. If she presses the button, the mech-
anism will toss the coin twice, rst at t1, and then again at a later time,
t2. If S does not press the button, the coin will only be tossed once, at t1.
Suppose that S presses the button, and that the coin lands heads in both
tosses. Let p = “the coin is tossed at t1, and lands heads”, and let q = “the
coin is tossed at t2, and lands heads”. Since the coin might land tails in
the t1-toss, whatever S does at t0, Np is true. [. . .] If S would refrain from
pressing the button, the coin might land tails in the t1-toss, in which case
p ⊃ q would still be true. Hence, N(p ⊃ q) is true. On the other hand, Nq
is false. By not pressing the button, S can ensure the falsity of q. Moreover,
p is made true earlier than q. (2000: 284)
A similar revision, however, avoids that counter-example too:
Beta′′: From N(p ⊃ q), Np, and no one has any choice before p was already made true
about whether q, deduce Nq.
Given that P0 is made true before anyone had any choice about anything, one could
rely on Beta′′ in a version of the Consequence Argument. Yet the plausibility of Beta′′
depends on the plausibility that, once a proposition has been made true, one is unable
to act so that it might be false. To see this, suppose we change Carlson’s example so
that S’s choice whether to press the button occurs not at t0 but at t1.5 (that is, aer t1
but before t2) and the coin still did land heads in the t1-toss but, if S were to refrain
from pressing at t1.5, the coin might have landed tails in the t1-toss. If this change were
plausible, we would have a counter-example to Beta′′. So, to plausibly rely on Beta′′
in the Consequence Argument, we need the strong xity-of-the-past premiss – that is,
NMP0 – to block this kind of counter-example. And then Beta
′′ has no advantage over
BetaWM (dened later).
3 Van Inwagen 2000: 8–9; 2017a: 180. This move is also made by O’Connor (2000:
11–12), Carlson (2000: 287), Huemer (2000: 538), Pettit (2002: 222–23), Turner (2009:
568), and Steward (2012: 29–30).
4 In McKay and Johnson 1996: 119, BetaMW is called β2 and BetaWM is called β1.
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BetaMW: From NM(p ⊃ q) and NWp, deduce NWq.
BetaWM: From NW(p ⊃ q) and NMp, deduce NWq.
AlphaM is just Alpha given the NM reading. It needs, I think, no further
argument – if p is a logically necessary truth, it seems clear that one cannot
act so that pmight be false. But one might worry that either BetaMW or
BetaWM is open to some undiscovered counter-example, as Beta was given
the NW reading.5 With these rules, however, we have more reason to be
optimistic. There are two cogent arguments for their validity.
[p. 708] For the validity of BetaMW, consider the following argument,
which takes the form of a proof by contradiction:
(1) NM(p ⊃ q) Premiss
(2) NWp Premiss
(3) ∼NWq Assumption
(4) q From (1) and (2)
(5) Someone is or was able to act so that q would
be false.
From (3) and (4)
(6) For all persons S, all possible acts ϕ, and all
present and past times t such that S is able to
ϕ at t, if S were to ϕ at t, then S would act at t
so that p ⊃ q would be true.
From (1)
(7) Someone is or was able to act so that
∼q & (p ⊃ q) would be true.
From (5) and (6)
(8) Someone is or was able to act so that p would
be false.
From (7)
(9) ∼NWp From (8)
(10) NWp & ∼NWp From (2) and (9)
(11) NWq From (3) and (10)
We have that NM(p ⊃ q) and NWp together entail NWq. Hence BetaMW
is valid. Still, some of the inferences in this argument might need some
explanation. For the inference from (1) and (2) to (4), note that NM(p ⊃ q)
entails p ⊃ q and that NWp entails p. The idea behind the inference from
(1) to (6) is simply that, if one is unable to do anything such that p ⊃ q
might be false, then it must be that, for the things one is able to do, p ⊃ q
5 Although they haven’t found any counter-examples, Finch and Wareld (1998:
525) question whether these rules are valid. Van Inwagen (2004: 223–24; 2017b: 12–13)
expresses similar worries.
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would be true if one were to do any of those things.6,7 The inference from
(5) and (6) to (7) is perhaps controversial. It follows from (5) that some
person S is able to do [p. 709] something at some time t such that ∼q
would be true if S were to do that thing at t, and it follows from (6) that,
if S were to do that thing at t, then S would act at t so that p ⊃ q would be
true. Hence S is able to act at t so that both ∼q and p ⊃ q would be true.8
And then S is able to act at t so that ∼q & (p ⊃ q) would be true.
There is an analogous argument that BetaWM is valid:
(1) NW(p ⊃ q) Premiss
(2) NMp Premiss
(3) ∼NWq Assumption
(4) q From (1) and (2)
(5) Someone is or was able to act so that q would
be false.
From (3) and (4)
(6) For all persons S, all possible acts ϕ, and all
present and past times t such that S is able to
ϕ at t, if S were to ϕ at t, then S would act at t
so that p would be true.
From (2)
(7) Someone is or was able to act so that p & ∼q
would be true.
From (5) and (6)
(8) Someone is or was able to act so that p ⊃ q
would be false.
From (7)
(9) ∼NW(p ⊃ q) From (8)
(10) NW(p ⊃ q) & ∼NW(p ⊃ q) From (1) and (9)
(11) NWq From (3) and (10)
6 This inference is valid given the right-to-le direction of Lewis’s (1973: 21) duality
denition of ‘might’ counterfactuals:
Duality: p q =df ∼(p ∼q),
that is,
Duality Right-to-Le: From ∼(p ∼q), deduce p q.
We don’t need the more controversial le-to-right direction, that is,
Duality Le-to-Right: From p q, deduce ∼(p ∼q).
Given Duality Le-to-Right, Stalnaker’s (1981: 100) seemingly non-paradoxical claim
that John might not have come to the party if he had been invited, but I believe he would
have come amounts to a Moorean paradox.
7 The restriction to present and past times in (6) is needed unless we strengthen the
N operators so that Np also rules out that anyone will have a choice about whether p.
That strengthening wouldn’t make the premisses any less plausible.
8 This inference is valid if the following inference rule is valid:
Conjunction Composition: From r p and r q, deduce r p & q.
This rule is valid in the systems of Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973); see Chellas 1975:
138, 150n15 for some further examples.
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In much the same way as in the argument for the validity of BetaMW, we
have that NW(p ⊃ q) and NMp together entail NWq. Hence BetaWM is
valid.
With AlphaM, BetaMW, and BetaWM, we can give either one of the two
xity premisses the weaker NW reading and adopt one of the following
versions of the Consequence Argument:9 [p. 710]
The Consequence Argument (weak-xity-of-the-past version)
(1) ◻((P0 & L) ⊃ P) A consequence of determinism
(2) ◻(P0 ⊃ (L ⊃ P)) From (1) by normal modal logic
(3) NM(P0 ⊃ (L ⊃ P)) From (2) by AlphaM
(4) NWP0 Premiss, weak xity of the past
(5) NW(L ⊃ P) From (3) and (4) by BetaMW
(6) NML Premiss, strong xity of the laws
(7) NWP From (5) and (6) by BetaWM
The Consequence Argument (weak-xity-of-the-laws version)
(1) ◻((P0 & L) ⊃ P) A consequence of determinism
(2) ◻(L ⊃ (P0 ⊃ P)) From (1) by normal modal logic
(3) NM(L ⊃ (P0 ⊃ P)) From (2) by AlphaM
(4) NWL Premiss, weak xity of the laws
(5) NW(P0 ⊃ P) From (3) and (4) by BetaMW
(6) NMP0 Premiss, strong xity of the past
(7) NWP From (5) and (6) by BetaWM
Thus we have two new options for raising the price of compatibilism.
Of these, the weak-xity-of-the-laws version is, I think, especially com-
pelling.
Given a necessitarian view of laws of nature, both the weak and
the strong xity-of-the-laws premisses seem plausible. But consider a
Humean view of laws, where these laws hold contingently and merely de-
scribe (rather than prescribe) how the world develops. Given this kind of
view, there seems to be little reason to accept the strong xity-of-the-laws
premiss, that is, NML (Vihvelin 1988: 231; 1990: 376–77 and Beebee and
9 One might object that, in these versions of the Consequence Argument, we could
replace AlphaM and BetaMW by the following variant of Beta suggested by Widerker
(1987: 41):
Beta◻W: From ◻(p ⊃ q) and NWp, deduce NWq.
This would let us infer (5) directly from (2) and (4) and thus skip lemma (3). Yet the
plausibility of Beta◻W depends on the plausibility of logically necessary propositions’
being unavoidable in the strong sense, that is, it depends on the plausibility of AlphaM.
It’s clearer to treat the transfer of unavoidability separately from the relation between
unavoidability and logical necessity, since these are two distinct, controversial issues.
See also footnote 24.
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Mele 2002: 206–10). To see this, suppose, as seems fairly plausible, that,
if it’s still contingent shortly aer p is made true whether ∼q will be made
true, then the ‘might’ counterfactual ‘If it were the case that p, it might be
the case that ∼q’ is true, even if p and q are true.10 (If, for example, S will
toss a coin at t which will in fact land heads, it still seems plausible that, if
S were to toss the coin t, it might land tails.) Then, given a Humean view,
there’s a trivial argument against the strong xity-of-the-laws premiss.
Plausibly, you are able to do what you actually do. And, if you are able to
do what you actually do and shortly aerwards it’s still contingent what
laws will turn out to be the actual [p. 711] laws of nature, then you’re able
to act so that L might be false. Hence, on a Humean view of laws, NML
could plausibly be denied.11
But denying the weak xity-of-the-laws premiss – that is, NWL – is
less trivial. I shall highlight two problems. To see them, assume rst that
NWL is false. If NWL is false, someone must at some point have been able
to act otherwise than they actually did. Let t1 be the rst time t such that,
for some true proposition P, someone was able to act at t so that P would
be false.12 And let P0 be a true proposition expressing the total state of
the world at a time before, but arbitrarily close to, t1. FromNMP0, we have
that the total state of the world before t1 is xed.13 To block an application
of the weak-xity-of-the-laws version of the Consequence Argument at t1,
we have that NWL is false at t1 and hence that some person S is able to act
at t1 so that L would be false.
The rst problem is a deterministic variant of the luck problem for
libertarianism.14 Since S does not in fact act at t1 so that L would be false,
no feature of the total state of the world before t1 – including S’s character,
deliberation, and mental states – ensures that S acts at t1 so that L would
10 This claim is ruled out by Lewis’s (1973: 21, 26) account of counterfactuals, which
combines the duality denition of ‘might’ counterfactuals (see footnote 6) with
Conjunction Conditionalization: From p & q, deduce p q.
But the claim is compatible with Lewis’s (1986: 63–65) would-be-possible account of
‘might’ counterfactuals.
11 Compare Finch and Wareld’s (1998: 526) analogous point about theMind Argu-
ment.
12 Or, if time is dense, let t1 be an arbitrarily early such time.
13 Lewis (1981: 116–17) only takes the remote past to be xed. But, as argued by Ginet
(1990: 107–10) and Huemer (2000: 541–44), the reason the remote past seems xed is
that it is the past and not because it is, in addition, remote. Lewis (1979: 462–63, 468)
argues fairly convincingly that, if one were to act otherwise, there would have been a
divergence miracle shortly before the act. But it doesn’t follow that one is able to act so
that there would have been a divergence miracle shortly before the act; see Ekstrom
2000: 50 and Huemer 2000: 541–42.
14 Beebee and Mele (2002: 220–21) spell out the parallels between the luck problem
for libertarianism and this variant for Humean compatibilism.
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be false. But then, if S had acted at t1 so that L would have been false, it is
hard to see what could explain the dierence in acting, since everything
about S and the state of the world before t1 would have been exactly the
same as it was in the actual world. Given a Humean view of the laws of
nature, no dierence in these laws could explain the dierence in acting,
since the laws then depend on what happens, rather than the other way
around.15 Hence it seems that the acting so that L would be false would
have been due not to S’s agency but to chance. Without chance turning
out otherwise than it actually [p. 712] did, there’s nothing S could have
done to render L false at t1. It seems that S is merely able to act at t1 so
that L might be false – acting so that L would be false at t1 would have
required chance to turn out otherwise – hence it seems that S is unable
to act at t1 so that L would be false.16
The second problem is that S’s ability to act at t1 so that L would be
false requires that S has the incredible ability to break the laws of nature
(Beebee and Mele 2002: 212–13). To see this, note that, since P0 expresses
the total state of the world at a time just before t1, we have from NMP0
that the actual state of the world just before t1 is exactly the same as it
would have been just before t1 if S had acted at t1 so that L would have
been false.17Hence the laws wouldn’t have been broken by some miracle
before t1; the laws would be broken by S’s act.18 Thus rejecting NWL at t1
requires that S has the incredible ability to do something at t1 such that,
if S did it, S’s act would break what are in fact the laws of nature.19,20
15 One might object that the laws could explain the dierence retroactively. Note,
however, that a key part of what gives laws their explanatory power is their overall
simplicity and coherence. Lewis points out that
The violated deterministic law has presumably not been replaced by
a contrary law. Indeed, a version of the violated law, complicated and
weakened by a clause to permit the one exception, may still be simple
and strong enough to survive as a law. (1973: 75)
If a lawwould have been simpler andmore coherent without the ad hoc clause thatmakes
the one exception permitting your acting otherwise, then that law cannot, plausibly,
explain your acting otherwise.
16 Note that I’m not assuming here that acting so that p would be false requires that
one has control over whether p, that is, by also being able to instead act so that p would
be true. Thus I’m not ruling out that one is able to act so that p would be false if so
acting requires chance to turn out a certain way. If chance turns out the required way,
one might arguably be able to act so that p would be false. My claim is merely that, if
acting so that p would be false requires chance to turn out a certain way and chance
doesn’t turn out in the required way, then one is unable to act so that p would be false.
17 See footnote 13.
18 Thus we close Lewis’s (1981: 119) loophole that the act that would render P0 & L
false ‘would not itself falsify any law – not if all the requisite lawbreaking were over and
done with beforehand’; see Huemer 2000: 541–44; 2004.
19 That is, S would have rendered the law false in Lewis’s (1981: 120) strong sense.
20 One might wonder why – if one accepts a Humean view of laws – one wouldn’t
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While these two problems for denying NWL are perhaps surmount-
able, they are not problems for denying NML given a Humean view.21 On
a Humean view, it’s contingent what laws will turn out to be the actual
laws of nature. So, as we argued earlier, no matter how you were to act,
you would be acting so that Lmight be false. And, since this holds even if
you don’t act otherwise than you actually do, there is no need to explain
any dierence in acting compared to how you actually act; so the rst
problem doesn’t apply. Regarding the second problem, note that acting
so that Lmight be false doesn’t require any incredible ability if, regardless
of what you do, L might be false. Thus, on a Humean view, denying NML
raises neither of these problems, while denying NWL raises both. [p. 713]
The weak-xity-of-the-past version has perhaps also an advantage.
There are two main lines of argument in support of the xity-of-the-
past premiss. One is based on the idea that the past is xed in the sense
that, when we evaluate counterfactuals, we try to keep the (remote) past
xed.22 This counterfactual-xity argument seems to support not just the
weak version of the premiss but also the strong version. The other line
of argument is based on the idea that the past isn’t up to us, that is, the
idea that the past is not under our present control.23 This present-control
argument supports NWP0 but not NMP0. It doesn’t support NMP0, because
the past might fail to be xed in a way that is independent of our acts.
That is, regardless of what anyone did, many possible pasts including the
actual past might be the past – so P0 might be true, and P0 might be false.
And then the past wouldn’t be up to us: no one [p. 714] would be able to
act so that P0 would be false. NWP0 would be true, but NMP0 would be
false. Thus one of the main lines of argument in support of the xity of
the past only supports the weak version of the premiss.
Denying the weak xity premisses is hence more challenging than
denying their strong variants. While this doesn’t amount to a defence
of incompatibilism, it shows that the new strengthened versions of the
Consequence Argument are more problematic for compatibilism than
the version that requires both strong xity of the past and strong xity of
be willing to just bite this bullet and accept, as a consequence of the contingency of the
laws, that we have this ability. Isn’t this just a consequence of the overall Humean set-up?
No. The contingency of the laws doesn’t require that they are up to us; that’s a further
tenet of Humean compatibilism.
21 Berofsky (2012: 252–54) oers some potential solutions these problems.
22 See, for example, Lewis 1979: 461–72, Ginet 1990: 107–10, andHuemer 2000: 541–44.
Lewis (1979: 458, 463) allows the immediate past to not be xed; see footnote 13.
23 See, for example, Mele 1995: 249.
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the laws.2425
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